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1	No: HHBCV15-6028096 S : SUPERIOR COURT
2	GREAT PLAINS LENDING, LLC, : JUDICIAL DISTRICT Et al. OF NEW BRITAIN
4	v. : AT NEW BRITAIN, CONNECTICUT
5	STATE OF CONNECTICUT : February 4, 2015
6	DEPARTMENT OF BANKING, et al :
7 8	B E F O R E: The Honorable Carl J. Schuman, Judge
9	APPEARANCES:
10	Representing the Plaintiffs:
11	Attorney Robert Rosette
12	Rosette, LLP 565 W. Chandler Boulevard Suite 212
13	Chandler, AZ 85255
14 15	Also Present: Attorney Saba Bazzazieh and Attorney Attorney Anthony Jannotta
16	Depresenting the Defendant.
	Representing the Defendant:
17	Attorney Robert J. Deichert Assistant Attorney General
18	P.O. Box 120 55 Elm Street
19	Hartford, CT 06141-0120
20	Also Present: Attorney John Langmaid, AAG
21	
22	Recorded By: Donna L. Peluso
23	Transcribed By:
24	Donna L. Peluso Court Recording Monitor
25	20 Franklin Square New Britain, CT
26	860-515-5380 Ext. 3080
27	

1	(In open court).
2	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated. This is
3	the matter of Great Plains Lending, LLC v. The State Banking
4	Department. Can I have the appearances of counsel,
5	beginning with plaintiffs' counsel.
6	ATTY. ROSETTE: My name is Robert Rosette, specially
7	appearing on a limited basis on behalf of Great Plains
8	Lending, LLC Clear Creek Lending, which are 100 percent
9	owned and operated by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe, and also
10	specially appearing on a limited basis on behalf of the
11	Tribe's Tribal Chairman, John Shotton.
12	THE COURT: All right. Are you the arguing counsel?
13	ATTY. ROSETTE: Yes.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	ATTY. ROSETTE: I should be handling potentially about
16	95 percent of the argument depending on what the questions
17	are.
18	THE COURT: True. All right. I'm not sure that we
19	recognize special or limited appearances in this state, but
20	we won't address that issue now. All right. Can we move
21	along. Go ahead, counsel.
22	ATTY. BAZZAZIEH: Saba Bazzazieh, Your Honor, on behalf
23	of plaintiffs.
24	THE COURT: All right.
25	ATTY. JANNOTTA: Anthony Jannotta, Your Honor, from the
26	Denton's law firm, on behalf of plaintiffs as well.
27	THE COURT: All right. For the commissioner?  Page 2

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1 ATTY. DEICHERT: Assistant Attorney General Robert 2 Deichert. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 ATTY. LANGMAID: Assistant Attorney General John Langmaid. 5 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, counsel. I've 6 7 read the papers, and I'm familiar with the case and the issues. 8 9 Let me just address a few preliminary matters so we can 10 get to the heart of the matter. First, I'm inclined -- I am 11 prepared to consider the plaintiff's application for a 12 temporary injunction ex parte as a motion for stay. 13 Although, I would just advise the plaintiffs to become more familiar with Connecticut procedure as we go forward, but 14 15 I'm not going to default plaintiff on that sort of technical 16 basis. 17 Similarly, I'm not going to consider the issues in the 18 defendant's motion to dismiss as relevant to the motion for 19 stay. We can address the motion to dismiss at the 20 appropriate time, but those issues are also somewhat 21 technical and I don't feel they rise to the level of being 22 relevant to the motion for stay. So we don't have to 23 address those today. Third, I will tell you that I'm not going to order the 24 25 plaintiffs to pay into the Banking Department any monies by 26 February 6, so we don't have to address that sort of 27 time-sensitive issue, but I am interested in hearing from

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1 both sides either now or after court informally or by a 2 letter, or otherwise, what sort of insurances that the 3 plaintiffs could give and that the defendants would want to 4 assure that in the event that your appeals are unsuccessful 5 that you would be good to pay the, pay the order or pay any 6 judgment. So you can address those either now or later. 7 And just, for example, what I had in mind was either an 8 escrow account or bond or something along those lines. 9 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, and --10 THE COURT: And you do have to stand when addressing 11 the Court. 12 ATTY. ROSETTE: I'm sorry. 13 THE COURT: Yes, sir? 14 ATTY. ROSETTE: Forgive me, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 ATTY. ROSETTE: While, obviously, you've read our 17 briefs and --18 THE COURT: I have. 19 ATTY. ROSETTE: -- and we're challenging this, the 20 jurisdiction of the Department of Banking, we, we believe 21 that paying those amounts in the form of escrow and a bond 22 would be acceptable. 23 THE COURT: I see. Okay. I don't know whether that 24 was something that you came close to agreeing upon with the 25 defendants, but perhaps you can either talk to defense 26 counsel after the hearing or, and see if you can agree on 27 the form for doing that. Or if you can't, then you can just

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submit a letter to me with your best proposal, and I could hear from the defendants best proposal and decide. But it sounds like you ought to be able to agree, or we ought to be able to find a way that can protect both sides from the financial consequences of losing.

So let's not belabor that issue, and we'll just really focus on the cease and desist order and get to the merits, which I have read a bit about. So, Mr. Rosette, on that?

ATTY. ROSETTE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. The relief that we're seeking really has a, has a four-part test, as you know, and if I could just address each of those.

We really -- the tribe in this case, and it is the Otoe-Missouria Tribe when, when bringing the action against these two, two tribal business entities and the chairman, has no adequate remedy at law. First of all, there is a harm to the government that cannot be fixed by a, any sort of monetary relief that, that we could seek. There is direct harm to the tribe's sovereignty. The tribe in this case would be unable to fund extremely important government programs. These books are 100 percent taxed by the tribe. Every penny of the revenues from these, these programs these programs go to health-care dollars for elders, as you saw in the affidavits, also language programs, other governmental services by the tribe. This is a sovereign nation, and it does have these government programs.

THE COURT: But isn't this essentially a commercial Page 5

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activity by the tribe that perhaps shouldn't get the same sort of protection as attempt by a state government to interfere with things that go more to the essence of tribal self-government, such as schools or courts or, or government institutions?

ATTY. ROSETTE: Well, these are, these are commercial enterprises that are 100 percent owned by the tribal government, and the attributes of sovereignty, this has been held by the supreme court over and over again in Kiowa v.

Manufacturing Technologies, more recently in the Bay Mills case, that the attributes of tribal sovereignty extend over these tribal enterprises, specifically here these enterprises have been structured and created in a manner in which they are arms of the tribe. So they are, are provided with all of those tribal attributes including sovereign immunity from suit.

And, again, the way that they've been structured is not only are the, the businesses owned 100 percent by the tribe, they're managed by the tribe. And, most importantly, as I stated, all of the revenues are directed to tribal government programs. They are taxed 100 percent by the tribe. That's essentially the only tax base that this tribe has because of, of the rural location of the government and, and their inability to seek various forms of economic development. So it's not uncommon that tribes pursue these types of interests through commercial ventures owned by the tribe to provide for their citizenry as a sovereign nation.

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The other adequate, inadequate remedy at law that we have is with regard to the chairman himself. The chairman of the tribe is obligated to follow the law of the tribe, to adhere to its constitution, and he would be unable to do so in this instance, and, obviously, we don't have any, and adequate remedy at law for that as well.

With regard to the second prong, whether or not the tribe will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction really allowing the department to proceed with enforcement of an order results in an unprecedented finding that a state administrative body can abrogate the sovereign immunity of an indian tribe.

THE COURT: But why didn't you cite the second circuit decision in Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. Financial Department of New York in your brief?

ATTY. ROSETTE: Because, Your Honor, this is a classic case of whether or not the tribe waived its sovereign immunity from suit, and there's only two ways in which a tribe can waive its sovereign immunity from suit. It can consent to waive that immunity unequivocally and expressly and grant a court, a state court jurisdiction or congress can abrogate that immunity.

New York, the second circuit case is completely distinguishable, and that case, the tribe, and it was this tribe, which is no coincidence, brought that case. It was an affirmative action and met that first prong. They consented to that court's jurisdiction unequivocally and Page 7

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jurisdiction.

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1 specifically and brought that affirmative action against the 2 state of New York. That is not want is occurring here at 3 all. 4 THE COURT: But you said this is an unprecedented state action, but it appears the state of New York did the same 5 6 thing. 7 ATTY. ROSETTE: The, the state --8 THE COURT: One counsel at a time, please. 9 ATTY. ROSETTE: The, the state of New York they -- my 10 understanding is they did not do the same thing. That the 11 state of New York has not taken any actions to find a 12 sovereign government. They haven't issued any fines to the 13 Otoe-Missouria Tribe, and they haven't attempted to enforce 14 any fines against the Otoe-Missouria Tribe. What the state 15 of New York was doing was impacting the tribe's ability to 16 engage in their lending operations by making very direct 17 threats to the banks that the Otoe-Missouria Tribe was 18 dealing with. And the Otoe-Missouria Tribe had 19 affirmatively brought action against the state of New York 20 in a New York court waiving -- obviously, because they're

> This action here would be unprecedented whereby a state agency attempted to abrogate the sovereignty of the tribe and abrogate the sovereign immunity of the tribe without either of the very two clear principles that need to be demonstrated. And, again, that's either consenting to that,

bringing the action -- they are consenting to that court's

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1 to the jurisdiction of the state or pointing to 2 congressional abrogation of that sovereign immunity. And I 3 would add, Your Honor, that there is none of those arguments posed in any of the papers filed by the state. They don't 4 5 make any of those points, they don't cite to any of those cases, and, as I just pointed out to you, the second circuit 6 7 case in New York completely misses the mark with regard to the issues that before you here today. 9 THE COURT: Well, I follow what you're saying. I think 10 that it's at least superficially close enough that it's something that you should have cited. You're faulting the 11 12 defendants for not citing things, but this case is a similar 13 situation. I see the differences now, but I think it would have been helpful to cite it rather than avoid it. 14 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, may my colleague make a 15 16 point? THE COURT: Well, divided argument is --17 18 ATTY. ROSETTE: Oh, okay. THE COURT: -- not favored. 19 ATTY. ROSETTE: That, that's fine, Your Honor, but --20 21 THE COURT: But we, we can move on. 22 ATTY. ROSETTE: There, there are -- there are cases 23 that, that this court can look to that we did cite, whereby 24 state governments have attempted to bring actions against tribally owned enterprises. We cited those with regard to, 25 in California, the Miami Nation Enterprises case, whereby 26 the state of California attempted to bring an action, an 27

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1 enforcement action against --2 THE MONITOR: Okay. Excuse me, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Right. THE MONITOR: When your book laying on the button, it's 4 5 causes --THE COURT: Oh. 6 7 ATTY. ROSETTE: Oh. I'm sorry. 8 THE COURT: Stay away from that. Right. Thanks. 9 ATTY. ROSETTE: And then also in Colorado we cite to 10 the Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans case, and in both 11 of those cases, the states attempted to bring exactly the, 12 the same facts that we have here and attempted to bring 13 actions against those arms of the tribe, even though they 14 were business enterprises. And in both of those cases, the, 15 the tribes sovereign immunity arguments have, have been upheld consistent with the federal courts and supreme court 16 17 precedent that I have identified. 18 The state of New York case and the underlying basis for it is just not applicable in this case because issues with 19 regard to whether or not the tribe waived its sovereign 20 21 immunity from suit were not at issue. And all those 22 underlying facts are irrelevant to the court issues, legal 23 issue as to whether or not the tribe has waived its 24 sovereign immunity from suit. All of this argument, Your Honor, goes to the third 25 prong obviously with regard to our --26 27 THE COURT: Likelihood --

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1 ATTY. ROSETTE: -- likelihood of success --2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 ATTY. ROSETTE: -- in moving this, in moving this case forward. The, the last --4 THE COURT: Why didn't you appear at the hearing? 5 ATTY. ROSETTE: Well, Your Honor, we -- it's, it's 6 7 because we did file our -- we did make a special appearance. 8 We filed, what I believe very strong briefs with regard to 9 supreme court precedent, state court precedent, recognizing 10 the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, and we felt that, that we had put our best foot forward and expected the case 11 to be dismissed. And, and, you know, that's --12 13 Going to the, the fourth prong of the test was, with regard to the balance of equities tipping in the tribe's 14 favor. We just point out that the Connecticut law here in 15 this case does not apply, and the mere fact that Connecticut 16 has passed a statute restricting small-dollar lending does 17 18 not itself prove that there's a public interest served in all cases if that statute can't be enforced or it's not 19 applicable to the Indian Tribe in this case. And we've 20 21 cited a couple of cases, obviously, Your Honor, for you to 22 consider with regard to those points. Secondly, there is public interest in favor of the 23 24 tribe that is really un-quantifiable in many respects, but nonetheless, there is significant public interest in 25 promoting self-government. You have a federally recognized 26

indian tribe here. It, it -- that tribe does predate the

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state of Connecticut, that predates the United States

Constitution and there is strong interest in insuring that

it has the ability to protect the welfare of its citizenry

and to operate as a government.

With regard to the issues here, the tribe has a commitment to protecting consumers. They have best practices in place. They have a regulatory agency in place with a strong commitment to regulate these loans, to insure federal compliance of all laws, of all federal laws to insure compliance with all tribal laws. The citizens of the state of Connecticut voluntarily, through electronic means, seek these loans out from this government, agree to the tribal court jurisdiction and agree to the provisions of these loans.

THE COURT: Don't we have a situation which the harm to individual consumers, at least as defined by state law, which is flagrantly violated here, is very concentrated. Whereas, the harm to tribal government seems to be rather defuse in that, as far as I know, you can engage in this business in all the other states, and just, at least, for the period of this appeal, can't do it in Connecticut? Doesn't that harm pale in comparison to the harm to a consumer who has to repay a loan at up to 400 percent interest?

ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, to answer your question, the, the -- the loan -- and I must tell you that the facts of how these transactions occur are irrelevant with regard Page 12

to the sovereign immunity argument. So I'd just like to preface my comments with that. But these loans are conducted and closed and the underwriting of the loans, et cetera, occur on the tribe's reservation pursuant to the tribe's laws. The customers of these loans understand the terms of the loans. They voluntarily enter those loans. They consent to the jurisdiction of the sovereign nation in this, to this extent. And the bottom line is, is that the, the loans themselves are compliant with all applicable law, both tribal and federal with regard to consumer protection.

The tribe has taken every step as a sovereign government to insure that those laws are followed and that consumers are protected. You know, it's, it's almost no

government to insure that those laws are followed and that consumers are protected. You know, it's, it's almost no different than a Connecticut resident that, that may take a loan out in the state of Nevada while visiting Las Vegas in contravention of Connecticut law in that case.

The third point that I wanted to make, though, is that the department is not harmed in this case because by their, their own admission, they can't do more itself to compel 'plaintiffs' compliance with this order; so, therefore, they're not necessarily harmed by having this stay in place as well.

THE COURT: You mean that let's say there were no administrative appeal. You're claiming that they, at least, admit that they can't enforce the cease and desist order?

ATTY. ROSETTE: Correct. That's where the, obviously, the attorney general's office would come in and -Page 13

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facilities.

1 THE COURT: Well, they're in now --2 ATTY. ROSETTE: -- at that point, we would have the --3 it's kind of a fait accompli because then we have the 4 sovereign immunity arguments that obviously take precedent. 5 THE COURT: Uh-hum. It doesn't appear that, although 6 I'm not sure, but it doesn't appear that the customers or 7 consumers who are taking these loans out are necessarily the 8 most sophisticated in the world, and that's probably why we 9 have these sort of usury laws. And, although, I'm sure they 10 check, submitted or accept on their internet application, 11 it, it doesn't seem improper for the state to attempt to 12 protect these sort of consumers who may not understand that 13 they're consenting to tribal, to jurisdiction and all the 14 other things that you claim that they have knowingly and 15 voluntarily consented to. 16 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, there's, there's nothing --17 very respectfully, there's nothing in the record that would 18 suggest that. In fact, there, there probably is strong 19 evidence that consumers who have the wherewithal to operate 20 a computer and engage in internet activity are, are -- are 21 sophisticated people. I'm sure that there is probably the 22 ability for the tribe at some point to demonstrate that the, the customers to an online-lending facility are readily 23 24 distinguishable from those in brick-and-mortar type

But all of that just right now are not facts that are before Your Honor. What is before Your Honor is that, is Page 14

that there is strong public interest for the tribe having its legitimate form of government, funding its government programs. The language programs for children. The old ladies that, that may need the dialysis machine in a health clinic, and the fact that this is a governmental operation. This is a sovereign nation that is not violating any applicable laws. As you read from our briefs, the state law of Connecticut just does not apply not only to the tribe, but not to these underlying loans.

And the Connecticut residents, what is in the facts, is the Connecticut residents do consent to the jurisdiction of the laws outside of the state of Connecticut where the loan is being closed on the reservation.

THE COURT: Doesn't the sovereign immunity argument get weaker when these transactions occur off reservation? They incur in cyberspace somewhere.

ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, they, they do not because the supreme court has held in, in the Kiowa case that sovereign immunity not only applies to tribally owned enterprises, but tribally owned enterprises that operate off of the reservation. And, again, if tribe's are not willing to consent to waivers of that sovereign immunity from suit, and, and if you read the Kiowa and the Bay Mills case, they both focus on this point, then congress does have the ability to abrogate that defense.

Congress, through its plenary power, can pass a law that states that if tribes want to conduct business off of Page  $15\,$ 

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1 their reservation in other states, then they are waiving 2 their sovereign immunity from suit. That is not the case 3 here. It is not -- it's not the case. Period. The state 4 does not make that argument. And, again, the Supreme Court 5 of the United States has been very clear that sovereign 6 would apply to the facts of this case. Even though there's 7 an argument that it occurs in cyberspace. 8 THE COURT: All right. What else would you like to 9 add? I understand the basics of your argument. I'm going 10 to certainly give you a chance to respond after I've heard 11 from the defendants. 12 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, I would just like to add 13 that we, that we do meet all four tests for the stay, and I 14 would just leave you with that it is not the tribes goal to 15 break laws, operate irresponsible businesses. They have a 16 strong commitment to consumer protection. They have very 17 strong codes and they, they have a commitment to consumer 18 protection. THE COURT: Well, what in this case show the tribe's 19 20 commitment to consumer protection? 21 ATTY. ROSETTE: Mostly, we've been able to provide you 22 the form of affidavits from the chairman, and in his carrying out of the tribal law to insure that those 23 24 protections exist. THE COURT: That's pretty vague. Anything more 25 specific? 26 27 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, we don't have anything more

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1 specific. But, again, the, the issue is whether or not the 2 tribe has waived its sovereign immunity from suit in this 3 case. So that's, that's all I have to say. 4 THE COURT: Sure. Thank you, sir. Mr. Deichert? 5 ATTY. DEICHERT: Thank you, Your Honor. We, obviously, 6 disagree that the plaintiffs have met the four-factor test. 7 The public interest, as Your Honor recognized, I think 8 weighs very heavily in favor of denying a stay in this case. 9 The people involved with these loans are generally -- and 10 we're prepared to put testimony on, if Your Honor would like 11 to hear it, about types of borrowers that have these loans. 12 As far as the tribe's consumer protection, I think it's 13 enough to say that certainly I don't think they dispute that 14 -- whatever consumer protection they have in place allows 15 them to do loans of up to 400 percent interest, and that 16 obviously is directly inconsistent with Connecticut's 17 consumer protection. And so these loans are uniquely 18 harmful in the sense that they tend to pray on lenders who 19 are, you know -- or borrowers who are unsophisticated, who 20 need money quickly, are willing to pay a very large interest 21 rate. And, again, we're willing to put on testimony on that 22 if Your Honor would like to hear it. 23 As to -- that also goes to the prong about interest of 24 the third parties. When you look at if the court were to 25 grant a stay in this case, that would allow Connecticut

consumers to presumably engage, you know, get loans during

the pendency of this appeal. Those loans could have terms
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1 that would go well outside, kind of the end of this 2 litigation. And even during this litigation, even in a 3 one-year period or even less, consumers can result -- can 4 get into significant trouble. If you look at the tribe's 5 website, for example, or the website for Great Plains 6 specifically, they have an example that they show a one 7 thousand dollar loan, basically the schedule requires that 8 the person taking that loan pay back over the -- and at the 9 end of the year pay back twenty-three hundred dollars in 10 interest on top of the one-thousand dollar loan. 11 So if you were to lift the stay in this case, that 12 would leave the tribe unfettered to get any number of 13 Connecticut consumers into that type of predicament. 14 THE COURT: Isn't that one that they might knowingly 15 and voluntarily get into? 16 ATTY. DEICHERT: That's -- You're correct, Your Honor. 17 I mean, and I guess, the judgment has been made by the 18 legislature that people should not be put in the position 19 where they're able to voluntarily agree to that because it's 20 illegal. 21 And now that gets to the point about applicable law. 22 My opposing counsel said that the second circuit's decision 23 in the Otoe case is irrelevant. I respectfully disagree. I 24 think it's highly relevant specifically to the issue of 25 applicable law. What the second circuit had there is a

situation very similar to what you have here in the sense

that there the tribe was seeking preliminary injunctive Page 18

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1 relief similar to a stay. And the second circuit -- the 2 district court denied the stay based on a lack of likelihood 3 of success on the merits. The second circuit affirmed that decision and concluded that the tribes had not put on 4 sufficient factual evidence that the location of the 5 6 transaction was off reservation; and, therefore, under --7 the district court properly denied the request. 8 Now, the second circuit offered the plaintiffs an 9 opportunity to develop facts on remand, and plaintiffs 10 chose, for whatever reason, to withdraw the case rather than take that opportunity. So for whatever means, that means 11 12 that the second circuit indicated that there's a good 13 argument that applicable law here is Connecticut law. 14 THE COURT: I understood Mr. Rosette's argument to be 15 that in the New York matter, the state of New York went after the third-party banks rather --16 17 ATTY. DEICHERT: That's --18 THE COURT: -- rather than the tribes. ATTY. DEICHERT: That, that is correct, Your Honor. 19 really the way I would conceptualize it is there's two 20 21 related issues. One is, is Connecticut law applicable to these transactions? The second circuit looked at that 22 issue. Concluded that the tribe had failed to establish a 23 24 likelihood of success on the merits of that issue. Now in the second circuit case, that's the only issue. 25 As Attorney Rosette said, they had -- they had voluntarily 26 invoked the jurisdiction of the district court --27

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THE COURT: That's true.

ATTY. DEICHERT: -- in order to get a court ruling.

That raises the question here. They had voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of this court on this administrative appeal.

Now they have certainly said throughout, and we admit, they have said throughout that they are not -- they do not intend to waive it. They've said that. I mean, and they have done everything that's possible for them to say that they're not intending to waive it. The question becomes are, are those statements of intent enough to avoid a litigation -- waiver by litigation conduct.

Now, Your Honor, in the -- in kind of a somewhat analogous situation of a Eleventh Amendment immunity for a state, the Supreme Court's decision in Lapides talks about a state waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity by seeking a federal forum, Specifically in the context of a removal in that case. But it -- there is an argument to be made, and we can certainly at the merits of this case address it as to whether by bringing this appeal they've waived their sovereign immunity.

Now that also gets to the question here, Your Honor, none of the these entities are actually the tribe itself. Now the plaintiffs have argued that they are arms of the tribe, and they're correct that there are situations where non-tribal -- non-governmental tribal entities can become arms of the tribe.

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Now, Your Honor is probably familiar with

"arm-of-the-state" analysis for state sovereign immunity

purposes, and one of the factors for that analysis is

whether any financial recovery from the entity would go

against the tribe or the state in this "arm-of-the-state"

situation.

Now if I could point Your Honor to the plaintiffs'

papers, it's Exhibit C on page 29 of Exhibit C. This is

papers, it's Exhibit C on page 29 of Exhibit C. This is a citation -- this is tribal law on LLCs and specifically tribally owned LLCs. If I could point Your Honor to page 29 of that exhibit, paragraph 1(b). That specifically provides that any recovery against the Tribally owned LLC will not inure against the tribe itself.

So if the plaintiff -- so that would go against that aspect of the arm of the tribe analysis, and this is a situation that -- at least in the "arm-of-the-state" context, that -- the second circuit has concluded that that is the most relevant factor is whether any financial recovery would go against the state.

Now, again, the plaintiffs, I'm sure, will have arguments for why that wouldn't control here, but that is certainly -- really, at this stage, when we're trying to determine whether there's grounds for litigation, and we believe there is.

Now to get to -- in addition, in the tribal law, LLC law it provides both that LLCs on page 14 of the same exhibit I was referencing, that LLCs cannot engage in a Page 21

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violation of criminal law. Now a violation of Connecticut's usury statute is a violation of Connecticut criminal law.

Now I'm sure that they'll have arguments that a violation of Connecticut criminal law is not a violation of criminal law for purposes of tribal law, but that's an issue that could, that would need to be developed.

Now they -- they talk about the Supreme Court's case in Kiowa, which is true, concluded that tribal sovereign immunity can bar suit based on off-reservation conduct. Now Kiowa did not involve a situation where the off-reservation conduct was in cyberspace or where it occurred 1,400 miles from the Tribe's reservation. Nor did it involve a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief.

So the Department has two aspects of its order: It has a cease and desist order, as case for declaratory injunctive relief and it has monetary aspects. Kiowa did not say that tribal sovereign immunity would bar a declaratory injunctive plan, and that's analogous to the state sovereign immunity situation where declaratory injunctive relief is more available. And I can cite Your Honor to a case TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, which 181 f.3d 676. It's a fifth circuit case from 1999 that discusses Kiowa specifically in this aspect and cites supreme court authority for the propositions.

THE COURT: With regard to financial order -- again, it's not the main focus here. But, I think originally the commissioner had ordered restitution that doesn't appear in Page 22

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1 the final order, is that now withdrawn? 2 ATTY. DEICHERT: I would say we are -- whatever the 3 commissioner ordered in the final order would be kind of the 4 applicable order. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 6 ATTY. DEICHERT: And so --7 THE COURT: And there does not appear to be a 8 restitution component to it. Just civil penalties and 9 injunctive relief. 10 ATTY. DEICHERT: Yep. That's my understanding. Oh, it 11 did. I'm sorry, Your Honor. If I may just confer? 12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 13 (Off record between counsel). 14 ATTY. DEICHERT: Okay. Your Honor, my client is 15 correcting my misstatement. 16 The restitution aspect did become operative by operation of law because it appeared in the "whereas" clause 17 18 of the final order. 19 THE COURT: Oh. 20 ATTY. DEICHERT: So I apologize for misspeaking. Now 21 on the applicable law, again, to go back to the second 22 circuit's decision in Otoe, the court noted that the second 23 tribe was going, going to be able to avoid state regulation 24 on online lending, it would need to show very specific 25 facts. 26 Now we're dealing with an administrative appeal, where 27 they defaulted and declined to challenge the facts below.

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And so that goes to the likelihood of success as well.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

ATTY. DEICHERT: Now, and so I believe as to the issue of reparable harm to the Tribe, Your Honor, I would agree that the harm at issue here is — I mean, ultimately, this is balancing of the equities. To the extent the harm — the Tribe has harm and we're not in any way denying them their sovereignty. Really the question is: what's the scope of the sovereignty, and what's the more immediate harm? Is it to the Connecticut citizens and residents who are being charged these rates that, as you noted, flagrantly violate Connecticut Law; or is it the general harm to the Tribe's conception of sovereignty? And the question really is: like, is there a limit to the Tribe's sovereignty? I mean certainly the state's sovereignty has limits. Pretty much any sovereign's sovereignty has limits. And really the question before the Court is: what are the limits of that?

The question for the Court today is whether we want to, while we're litigating those limits, do we want to leave Connecticut consumers unprotected? And we respectfully submit that the Court shouldn't. And I'm happy to present evidence on the public interest, if you'd like.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's necessary, but I think you said in your brief that the Tribe, even if it's enjoined from -- excuse us.

(Interruption).

THE COURT: Even if the Tribe is enjoined from doing
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1 this in Connecticut is free to do it in 49 other states. 2 we know if that's the case? Do we know if they are, they do 3 practice in some states? ATTY. DEICHERT: I actually do not know. I mean I 4 5 think it appears that they do, but they would be better able 6 to answer that question, Your Honor. 7 We have limited information about kind of the scope of the Tribe's business in Connecticut. We did have these 8 9 complaints that brought this administrative action and we're 10 sure there is others; but we do not really have much of an 11 idea of how much business the Tribe does in the state of 12 Connecticut, which goes to whether they've met their burden 13 on showing a harm where we're not even -- it could just be these three people. We don't really know. 14 THE COURT: What's the three people? 15 16 ATTY. DEICHERT: The three people that, that were involved in the administrative -- that, whose loans were at 17 issue in the administrative hearing. 18 19 We would imagine that that's not the only customers they have in Connecticut, but we, at this point I will 20 check, but I don't think we -- I don't believe that we have 21 22 other evidence at this point to, to go to the scope of Tribal business in Connecticut. 23

ATTY. DEICHERT: Yep.

against an indian tribe.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you this question which is a

slightly different topic, but on the issue of filing suit

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THE COURT: You claim that an administrative action is not such a suit. Even if that's the case, how would you enforce an administrative order without filing suit?

ATTY. DEICHERT: That's, that's a very good question, Your Honor. I mean I -- my understanding is -- I mean it's going to depend on the type of the kind of relief we were looking at. I mean, ordinarily, in order for us to enforce a money judgment, we would be required to, to go to court and obtain a judgment, an actual court judgment allowing for the award of money.

As to the injunctive relief, I would imagine probably the same. Now that goes back to the question of what consequence is it that we are now in court, and that's going to be something that, you know, we're -- obviously, we know that the plaintiffs have said that -- they were preserving their sovereign immunity, you know, notwithstanding having filed this action. And really the question, one of the questions, one of the many questions in this case is going to be: Can they do that?

You know, now a state -- to the extent the state is analogous, state sovereign immunity is, in other states, under Nevada v. Hall, is not required to be recognized. States can choose to recognize it or not choose to recognize it as a matter of comedy. But I mean, and tribal sovereign immunity, I think a lot of issues with sovereign, you know, are still being kind of worked out through the process, through the courts.

THE COURT: What sort of, given my statement, perhaps
even your position, that the plaintiffs are not going to be
required to pay anything to the defendants by February 6, is
there a likelihood of agreements with the plaintiffs as to
how they can insure payment of any judgment?
ATTY. DEICHERT: I believe that we would be more than
willing to, to discuss that with the plaintiffs and
THE COURT: Okay.
ATTY. DEICHERT: then determine an acceptable means
of assuring that.
THE COURT: Okay.
ATTY. DEICHERT: And if I may just to the sovereign
immunity argument
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
ATTY. DEICHERT: Your Honor, before I forget.
THE COURT: Yes.
ATTY. DEICHERT: There's two different types of claims
in this case. We have claims against the entities and we
have claims against the individual.
THE COURT: True.
ATTY. DEICHERT: Now the plaintiffs have focused a
great deal on the monetary claims against the individual.
We also have cease and desist declaratory injunctive claims
against the individual.
Now sovereign immunity just like, as with the state,
sovereign immunity generally not bar a declaratory
injunctive claim against an individual. And so that's

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1 another question that we would need to address. And so 2 really for today we're not asking the Court to resolve these 3 issues. There are many and complicated and difficult ones. 4 Really what we're asking is just allow us to protect 5 Connecticut consumers to the extent we can while we figure these issues out and litigate them forward. 6 7 THE COURT: Is that part of the responsibility of the 8 Department of Banking: Protection of consumers? 9 ATTY. DEICHERT: Well, certainly the responsibility is 10 to enforce Connecticut's banking laws and those laws are 11 intended to protect consumers specifically against usurious interest rates; and so, yes, I would say it is. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. What else would you like 13 14 to add? 15 ATTY. DEICHERT: I believe that's all, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir. 17 ATTY. DEICHERT: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Your response, Mr. Rosette? 19 ATTY. ROSETTE: Thank you, Your Honor. With regard to 20 the New York case again, that entire case does not go to the issues of sovereign immunity. And in this specific case, 21 22 our, our filings are not some sort of unwitting grant of 23 jurisdiction to this court. We filed only to contest 24 jurisdiction of this court. Oh, I'm sorry. To contest jurisdiction of the Department and the decisions that they 25 made against the Tribe and no other purpose. It's a very --26

THE COURT: Well, at the administrative level?

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1 ATTY. ROSETTE: At the administrative level. 2 THE COURT: Right. Right. 3 ATTY. ROSETTE: And --THE COURT: But why isn't your filing of a suit here in 5 superior court a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity? ATTY. ROSETTE: Because, Your Honor, we had a February 6 7 6th deadline that we needed to understand that there would be a stay of, of any sort of attempt to, to collect on, on 8 9 an assessment that is not valid. And so we're seeking that 10 from this court, and obviously we will address the sovereign 11 immunity arguments, you know, as, as this case proceeds. 12 THE COURT: But, but it seems that you had a choice, 13 just like you say the consumer had a choice as to whether or 14 not to accept these loans. You had a choice, and you could have decided not to file an action in superior court and 15 instead just let the Department of Banking orders stand 16 17 knowing that if they had filed an action in superior court 18 to attempt to enforce, then you would have a stronger sovereign immunity argument. But instead you filed your own 19 20 suit in sovereign immunity, why shouldn't you be held to the 21 consequences of your own choice? 22 ATTY. ROSETTE: Your Honor, we, we cite to well-established precedent in our brief that a sovereign 23 24 tribe's limited appearance in legal proceedings for the purpose of seeking dismissal of an administrative action or 25 any sort of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not 26

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waive any claims whatsoever to sovereign immunity.

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Kansas v. United States we cite, which is a tenth circuit case. We've got, we've got several other cases in a footnote that, that demonstrates the authority that, that -- this is our plaintiffs' application for a temporary injunction to begin with. But we, we are not unwittingly stepping into any issues except for what we have a very clear understanding of what we can do.

With regard to the arm of the tribe analysis, Your Honor, as you what might gather, state law and tribal law are completely a different analysis with regard to this issue. The arm of the tribe analysis has been litigated and decided upon by several courts at the federal and state level. It's very clear there is a specific test that we laid out in our, in our pleadings to you in our application for temporary injunctive. That test is whether or not the entity was created by tribal law, whether the tribe owns and controls the entity, the purpose of the tribal entity and whether the entity's economic benefits the tribe, whether or not their development arms are benefiting the tribe, and whether or not the tribe intended for this entity to have that arm of the tribe status. That test has been -- the case has been litigated over and over again, and the law has been very clear. Again, all on the basis of these tribal sovereign-type precedent that has been set.

To the point that, regarding injunctive relief not rising to the level of sort of the sovereign immunity-type waivers.

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1 THE COURT: Right.

ATTY. ROSETTE: I just point out that in the Bay Mills case, the state of Michigan sought injunctive relieve in that case, and the sovereign immunity of the tribe was upheld. So you can look to the supreme court's recent 2014 decision with regard to that.

And then with regard to whether or not, you know, this rises -- the Department of Banking's action rises to the level of a suit, the Banking Department obviously follows the Connecticut code in this matter which identifies the action they took as a contested case in the law itself. There is a decision-maker, there is briefing. There's no doubt that that was an adversarial action. And really sovereign immunity from suit means that we're not, that the Tribe is not subject to legal proceedings where those two factors come into play, whether the Tribe consented to that jurisdiction or whether congress abrogated it. And the very, as you probably know, the very basis of sovereign immunity which comes all the way from England, is that, you know, that governments should not have their treasuries depleted through various actions that come against them. So it's a time old notion of the law.

The Colorado case, and we also cited to some Minnesota administrative proceedings in our action, noted that those state enforcement actions were equivalent to suit. So we ask you to seek guidance particularly from the Colorado Supreme Court case.

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so forth.

One other point that I just make is, is they demonstrated the only record in this case is that there actually is no evidence that no more than three people have alleged harm or that this exists, and we ask you to recognize that the Tribe in this case, this is a government. There is a real impact to their sovereignty, to the chairman of this Tribe to follow his constitution, to carry out his legal duties to his Nation, and there are government programs that are at stake here with regard to the harm that can be caused if the stay is not put into place. THE COURT: Some of that I might be able to get from the affidavit or affidavits that you've attached. But I think some of the same issues are going to arise on the merits as to whether this goes to the essentials of tribal self-government as to whether you should be able to assert sovereign immunity. But the record is not going to contain that information because you didn't appear at the administrative hearing. So how, how are you going to prevail on the merits of the administrative appeal and establishing sovereign immunity when many of these facts are not in the record? ATTY. ROSETTE: Because, Your Honor, in the, in the Department of Banking proceedings, we did establish an administrative record with regard to the Tribe's laws, the

THE COURT: Well, was that part of your motion to Page 32

formation of the companies and the regulations and so on and

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1 dismiss? 2 ATTY. ROSETTE: Correct. 3 THE COURT: All right. Further comments? 4 ATTY. ROSETTE: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 5 THE COURT: All right. Let me just clarify that, 6 again, I'm not going to order the plaintiffs in any way to 7 make any payments to the state by February 6th or at any 8 point until the appeal is resolved. So would it be 9 sufficient if I just say in my order, which I will put in 10 writing, that the -- that the parties will work out the 11 remaining details. I'll say that, and if there are problems 12 then you can let us know. But from the responses, I'm 13 confident that the parties can agree on, on basically a 14 means of satisfying a judgment if there is a final judgment 15 against the plaintiffs, and then I'll address the injunctive 16 relief in my order. 17 I know you had some questions about scheduling. 18 state has filed a motion to dismiss; ordinarily, you have 30 19 days to respond and then we usually set it down for a 20 hearing three weeks thereafter. If the date is 21 inconvenient, because I know you're coming from Washington D.C., let us know and we'll find a convenient time. 22 ATTY. ROSETTE: Thank you. 23 24 THE COURT: And then we'll try to move along the 25 merits. It's probably -- well, as quickly as possible. Okay? All right. Thank you very much. We'll stand 26 27 adjourned.

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No: HHBCV15-6028096 S 1 : SUPERIOR COURT 2 GREAT PLAINS LENDING, LLC, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW BRITAIN 3 4 v. AT NEW BRITAIN, CONNECTICUT 5 STATE OF CONNECTICUT February 4, 2015 DEPARTMENT OF BANKING, et al 6 7 CERTIFICATE 8 9 I hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcription of the audio recording of the 10 11 above-referenced case, heard in Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain, Connecticut, before the 12 13 Honorable Carl J. Schuman, Judge, on the 4th day of February, 14 2015. 15 Dated this 18th day of February, 2015, in New Britain, 16 17 Connecticut. 18 19 20 21 22 23 Donna L. Pelluso. Court Recording Monitor 24 25 26